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ABSTRACT
In 2003, when the current war in Iraq began, I became
interested in learning how and why President Bush declared
the first pre-emptive war in the nation's history with the
support of the American people. In order to determine how
the country was led to war, the project posed the
following research questions: What rhetorical event(s) led
President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq with the
support of the majority of Americans? How did the Bush
Administration manage the crises that developed in
response to these rhetorical events and situations?
To provide an answer to the research questions, this
project investigated the events that occurred from
September 11, 2001 and ended with the first pre-emptive
attacks that took place on March 19, 2003. Research
included analysis of letters, media coverage and other
materials used to make the case for war, such as neo­
conservatives, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the
Project for the New American Century.
As this project is a critical analysis of rhetorical
events and situations, the primary research method used
was qualitative analysis. The project provided a critical
assessment of the events that led to the war and offers an
iii
explanation of how Americans were apparently so easily
misled to support the first pre-emptive war in its
history. The project also demonstrates how the Bush
Administration rhetoric, propaganda, and the fear of the
American public after September 11, 2001 led to the push
for another war in Iraq.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
How does one define war?. According to Mish (1989),
•war is defined in the following way:
1. a state or period of usually open and declared
armed fighting between states or nations, 2. the art
or science of warfare, 3. a state of hostility,
conflict, or antagonism, and 4. a struggle between 
opposing forces for a particular end. (p. 820)'
Although Mish provides a textbook definition of war, is
this a reflection of what war has come to mean in the 21st
century? What does the word war truly mean? Is it one
country dropping bombs on another country? Is war a
strong country invading a smaller, weaker neighbor and
dominating them? Essentially, Mish's definition lacks the
basic answers to the questions about what leads to war.
Since the beginning of human history, battles have
been won and lost. People have fought and died for causes
they believed in. An early and influential military
battle was the Greek-Persian Wars, fought from 499-488 BC.
The first wave of Crusader- Turkish Wars were fought from
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1100-1146, the German Civil War lasted, from 1100-1106, and
the second Norman-Byzantine War was fought from 1100-1108.
The United States also has a history of war. In the
formative years of the country, several wars were fought
on American soil. These wars included the French and
Indian War (1754-1763), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783),
and the Civil War (1861-1865) . The United States has also
fought wars in other places. The earliest of these wars
was the Spanish-American War, which was fought in 1898 in
Cuba. From 1914-1918, World War I raged on in Europe.
The United States entered World War I in 1917 with the
sinking of the Lusitania. Twenty-one years later, World
War II, which began in 1939 and ended in 1945, had Europe
in the grips of war yet again. The United States entered
this conflict when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in
1941. Later wars included the Korean War (1950-1953), the
Vietnam War (1957-1975), and the Persian Gulf War (1991).
The most recent war to be waged is the current conflict in
Iraq.
In the past, the United States entered conflicts to
defend itself when it was attacked, defend its economic
and political interests, or to defend other nations. For
instance, the United States entered the first Gulf War
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when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Gulf War demonstrates the
United States' desire protect weaker nations. When the
United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, the
country entered in to a conflict in the hills of
Afghanistan. The goal of this conflict was remove the
Taliban regime from power, topple the Al Qaeda network, 
and capture the mastermind behind the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, Osama bin Laden. However, this changed
when members of the Bush Administration began to push for
pre-emptive war to be launched in Iraq. A pre-emptive war
occurs when a nation attacks another nation without being
attacked first.
On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush began the
second war in Iraq with bombings of the country when then
leader Saddam Hussein refused to leave the country. The 
bombings on March 19th became the first time that the 
United States launched a pre-emptive war on another
country.
Purpose of the Project
Ever inquisitive (a trait that I developed as a child
and honed as a reporter in high school), I became
interested in the war that is being fought in Iraq. I was
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very skeptical when President Bush initiated war on Iraq
in 2003 and became interested in learning how and why the
President to declare the first pre-emptive war in the
nation's history supported by the American people. As a
result, the following research questions were posed for
this project: What rhetorical event(s) led President
George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq with the support of
the majority of Americans? How did the Bush
Administration manage the crises that developed in
response to these rhetorical events and situations?
Scope of the Project
The project investigated the events that led the
United States from September 11, 2001 to the current war
in Iraq. The specific time frame examined was the period 
beginning on September 11, 2001 and ending with the first 
pre-emptive attacks in Iraq on March 19, 2003. Research
on the events that led to the war included analysis of
letters, media coverage and other materials used to make
the case for war, such as the neo-conservatives, Weapons
J
of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and The Project for the New
American Century.
i4
Significance of the Project
The project and the investigation contained therein
have practical applications for the field of
Communications and society as a whole. Message is a
primary focus of communication research. It is also a
primary element of communication. It is important to be
,critical thinkers and consider the meaning behind the
message. People are influenced of the media. People are
also influenced by the images that the media portrays on a
daily basis. For instance, they saw pictures of Iraqi
citizens celebrating when the statue of Saddam Hussein was
torn down and were given the impression that the. country
as a whole was glad to have the presence of the United
States in their country. However, this is not necessarily
what is currently going on in Iraq. The insurgency in
Iraq and the United States' inability to end it can
suggest that perhaps many Iraqis do not want the United
States in their country. According to Whitlock (2004),
the insurgency in Iraq consists of different factions of
Iraqi, not foreign fighters.
The project will show how the Bush Administration
rhetoric, propaganda, and the fear of the American public
after September 11, 2001 led to the push for another war
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in Iraq. The rhetoric and propaganda used by the Bush
Administration is extremely significant because it
demonstrates that members of the administration first
convinced President Bush, then the American people that
Iraq should be invaded and Sadam Hussein deposed.
Theoretical Perspectives
Three theoretical perspectives can be used explain
the use of rhetoric and propaganda by the Bush
Administration. The perspectives discussed include: 1.
The Communication Model, 2. Persuasive Appeals, and 3.
Agenda Setting.
The first perspective used to explain the use of
rhetoric and propaganda is the Communication Model or more
specifically the Transactional Model of Communication.
According to Jaffe (2004), the model contains the
following elements: the sender, encoding the message,
message channel, the receiver’, decoding the message, 
encoding feedback, the feedback channel, decoding the
feedback, the specific situation, and noise. Jaffe also
states that messages are intentional. Griffin (2003)
further defines the message as, "The information conveyed
by the speaker to the audience.' Messages can be verbal or
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nonverbal." (p. 12) As stated previously, message is a
primary focus of communications research.
Hitler's messages before and during World War II are
a prime example of how messages can influence the
Communication Model. During their control of the German
government, Hitler and the Nazi party exerted influence
over every aspect of communication. For instance, the
sender of all messages to the German people was the Nazis.
As a matter of fact, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels to
the position of Propaganda Minister, allowing for absolute
control over who provided the German people with
information. The message channel is another example of
how Hitler's message influenced the Communication Model.
In Germany and. Nazi occupied territories, Hitler
controlled how and where people obtained their information
from. For instance, the Nazis controlled newspapers as
well as radio.
A second perspective can explain how rhetoric and
propaganda can effectively influence was persuasive
appeals. Griffin (2003) claims that:
Emotional appeals, or pathos can be one of the most 
challenging aspects of persuasion. On the one hand, 
research suggests that speakers persuade only when 
they appeal to emotions. Appeals to emotions can be 
powerful because they encourage your audience to
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relate to an issue on an internal, personal level.
(p. 432)
Griffin also identifies emotions that are primary and
secondary when speaking about persuasive appeals, and one
emotion that is not identified as either primary or
secondary. The primary emotions include: 1. Fear, 2.
Anger, 3. Surprise, 4. Sadness, 5. Disgust, and 6.
Happiness. The secondary emotions include: 1. Pride, 2.
Guilt, and 3. Shame. The final emotion that is common to
persuasive appeals, but is neither primary nor secondary,
is reverence.
Emotional appeals in propaganda during times of war
influenced people in different ways depending on what
persuasive appeal was used. For example, during World War
II Hitler used fear to persuade German citizens. Hitler
had the German people convinced that Jews were evil,
mongrels, and rapists bent on destroying the Aryan race.
The Nazi's were also famous for using propaganda that
encouraged the German people to be proud of their Aryan
heritage. After September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration appealed to the American people's fear of
another terrorist attack to justify invading Iraq.
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A third theory that informs this project is Agenda
Setting Theory. According to the University of Twente
website (2004), the agenda setting theory has several
assumptions related to it. The website states that
agenda-setting is when public awareness and concern of
relevant issues is created by the news media. The
University of Twente claims the two basic assumptions that
underlie most research on agenda-setting are:
(1). The press and the media do not reflect reality; 
they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on 
a few issues and subjects lead the public to perceive 
those issues as more important than other issues.
According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), "In choosing and
displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters
play an important part in shaping political reality." (p.
176) McCombs and Shaw also state that not only do the
readers of this information learn about a given issue, but
how much importance should be placed on that issue from
the amount of information that is provided in the news
story and the position that it takes. Essentially the
media then sets the "agenda."
Cook (2000) also comments on the use of agenda­
setting. According to Cook:
When policy requires the assent of others, media 
strategies are useful for persuading others to act.
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As face-to-face communication has become more 
difficult with the growing reach of government, the 
increasing number of participants and the dispersion 
of authority, media persuasion is a more attractive 
and efficient use of resources, (p. 215)
Cook (2000) claims that by using the media, those who make
decisions about policy can express their opinion, comment
on current events, and try to persuade the masses. Cook
also asserts that:
The publicity provided by the news media can offer 
key assistance to officials here in two ways. First, 
public opinion tends to see those issues discussed in 
the news as more likely to judge politicians by their 
stances on those issues . . . Second, even if public
opinion is not activated, politicians respond 
differently to more salient issues . . . [I]ncreasing'
the visibility of a particular issue also enhances 
the odds that political actors will do something abut 
it in a way that is responsive to public attention, 
(pp. 215-216)
Campbell, Martin, and Fabos (2000) state the
following about inquiries on agenda-setting, "Like uses
and gratifications, agenda-setting research has tried to
strike a balance between the views of the mass media as
all-powerful and barely powerful." (p. 470) Siune and
Borre (1975) studied agenda-setting in a Danish election.
The study examined the following aspects of the Danish 
election: political broadcasts from both radio and
television. These broadcasts included debates, programs
made by the political party, and programs where the
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candidates were asked questions by journalists and Danish.
citizens. According to Siune and Borre (1975) :
This study suggests three kinds of agenda-setting 
effects. The first is- the degree to which the media 
reflect the public agenda, called representation. In 
a representational agenda, the public influences the 
media. The second is the maintenance of the same 
agenda by the public the entire time, which is called 
persistence. In a persistent public agenda, the 
media may have little effect. The third kind of 
effect—media influencing the public—is exactly what 
classic agenda-setting theory predicts, (cited in 
Littlejohn 1999, p. 347)
Siune and Burre (1975) also discovered that the programs
with the most persuasive effect, were those that the
Danish citizens set the media agenda.
Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2004) conducted a study on
the presidential influence over the systematic agenda. In
their study, Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake examined the effects
of the president's influence over systematic agenda issues
such as civil rights policy, . clean air policy, and
domestic farm policy. According to Eshabaugh-Soha and
Peake, ". . . we argue that the president's success in
affecting media attention to issues may differ depending
on policy type." (p. 182) Eshabaugh-Soha and Peake used
Vector Autoregression analysis to analyze data collected
from 1950-1988 to determine how much the president's
statements on the aforementioned policy issues affect
12
media attention to the issues. The primary independent
variable for the study was presidential attention and the
primary dependent variable was media attention to policy
issues. The findings of the study showed that
presidential influence over civil rights policy and media
attention had mixed success over the time period examined.
The study also demonstrated that presidential attention to
clean air policy also caused the media to the policy.
Finally, presidential attention to domestic farm policy
also affects institutional attention.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Before investigating the events that led the country
from September 11, 2001 to war being declared on March 19,
2003, one must understand the rhetorical nature of war
itself. Stated more specifically, one must also
understand the rhetoric of propaganda used during times of
war and conflict. According to Lasswell (1927) propaganda
can be defined as, "the management of opinions and
attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion
rather than by altering other conditions in the
environment or in the organism." (cited in Finch 2000, p.
368) Further distinction can be made about the use of
propaganda during periods of war. According to Lutz
(1933), "War propaganda did not originate in 1914; the
oldest military treatise in the world, The Art of War, by 
Sun Tsu, described the technique 2,400 years ago." (cited
in Read 1972, p. 1) A wealth of information exists on the
subject of propaganda use during times of war. Those who
use propaganda also walk a line between what is the truth
and what is a lie. According to Dyer (1942) :
the differences between the effect on the people of 
propaganda and a Strategy of Truth may be more
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apparent than real. We have said, that all propaganda 
winks at truth. There are certain devices and rules 
which make propaganda effective, (p. 80)
Dyer suggests successful propaganda is that which
emphasizes extremes and seldom admits a middle ground.
Propaganda also leads a propagandist to take part of the
truth and dress it up in either black or white. The
result: statements that are part 'truth and part lie.
One way to understand how propaganda has been used
during times of war and conflict is to divide the
literature review into three sections: World War I, World
War II, and the Cold War. Each section ends with a
discussion about the propaganda films that emerged from
Hollywood during each period. Films have become one of
the most influential mediums of our time. Films have the
ability to cross over many social divides that other
mediums cannot. In the United States for instance, there
are people who cannot read, speak English, or are poorly
educated. Film can overcome these divides. From the time
of its invention through the Cold War, films have been
used as a form of war propaganda by Hollywood. It is for
this reason that film propaganda during each period of war
will be examined.
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World War I
When the first Great War began in Europe in 1914,
America took the position that it would remain neutral in
the conflict. However, with the sinking of the Lusitania,
the country officially entered the war. Before the
sinking of the Lusitania, the British supplied America
with encouragement to support the Allies. According to
Buitenhuis (1987):
The most complex and important role of Wellington 
House was to persuade the people of the United States 
that the Allied cause was just and necessary, that 
they should support the Allied war effort and, 
ultimately, that they should join the war on the 
Allied side. (p. 54)
According to Buitenhuis (1987) the British employed the
efforts of well-known authors James Barrie and A.E.W.
Mason to convince Americans to support the war effort.
According to Bruntz (1972), once the United States entered
the war, President Wilson realized that there was a need
for a propaganda agency. According to Woodrow Wilson's
State Papers and Addresses (1918), as a result, "On April
14, 1917, just eight days after war was declared, he
created, by executive order, the Committee on Public
Information." (cited in Bruntz 1972, p. 31) The members
of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) included the
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Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr.
George Creel who .was the civilian chairman. The CPI
employed many writers and used thousands of people in
America to its advantage. The purpose of the CPI was to
gain American support for entering the war. Creel said:
There was no part of the Great War machinery we did 
not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not 
employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the 
signboard—all these were used in our campaign to make 
our people and all other people understand the cause 
that compelled America to take arms in defense of its 
liberties and free institutions, (cited in Bruntz 
1972, p. 32)
According to Blakey (1970) the CPI distributed numerous
publications, "By the end of the war 2,499,903 copies were
in circulation and historians had established themselves
and pamphleteering as effective agents of literary
propaganda." (p. 34)
According to Lasswell (1971) creating the CPI was
equivalent to Wilson creating a separate cabinet, whose
sole responsibility was propaganda. Mock and Larson
(1968) stated that:
Without specific powers of enforcement, the CPI thus 
enjoyed censorship power which was tantamount to 
direct legal force, although this was energetically 
denied by the Committee during the war. The CPI 
insisted that it was merely an intermediary between 
law-enforcement bodies and the people, (p. 20)
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Mock and Larson (1968) also claim, that CPI's
representatives and agents were not able to make arrests,
they didn't often threaten either, but those organizations
that failed to keep the secrecy and patriotism according
to the Committee's standards could be handed over to the
appropriate agency for action. The CPI provided their
foreign agents with a steady stream of propaganda, as a
matter of fact, Mock and Larson claim:
By the time of the Armistice, the name of Woodrow 
Wilson, and a general idea that he was friend of 
peace, liberty, and democracy, were nearly as 
familiar in some of the remote places of the earth as 
they were in New York, St. Louis, or San Francisco.
(p. 235)
One method of transmitting propaganda to the public
that was used during WWI was the Four Minute Men. One of
the directors of the Four Minute Men, McCormick Blair
(1918) gave the following account of the organization's
origin:
War was inevitable; how could the people of this 
country be made to realize the seriousness of the 
situation? . . . And then one night someone spoke of
the tremendous movie audiences and how much could be 
accomplished if the audience could only be reached.
In less time than it takes to tell, it was agreed to 
enlist the support of movie managers in Chicago and 
get together a body of men who would speak during 
intermission, these men to speak only four minutes 
(largely because that was found to be the exact time 
available) and be called the Four Minute Men. (cited 
in Cornebise 1984, p. 1)
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According to Cornebise (1984) , Creel noted there was a
need for verbal communication during the Great War because
many citizens of the United States were born in foreign
countries and could not read English. When the Four
Minute Men first formed the organization in 1917, the
group spoke in Chicago theatres. Arrangements were made
with the managers of the theaters and the group was
introduced to the audience through the use of slides,
which projected the names of the each member of the group.
The slides also stated that the Four Minute Men would be
speaking for four minutes on a subject that was of
national importance. Cornebise also mentions that the
speeches of the Four Minute Men were blatantly
propagandistic and designed to counter the efforts of the
Germans. The Four Men were provided with the necessary
information that they needed. Cornebise claims that one
of the most successful Four Minute Men bulletins was No.
35, Where Did You Get Your Facts? The bulletin encouraged
American citizens to challenge- those who provide them with
false information.
In Britain, propaganda was handled by two fronts
during World War I. According to Messinger (1992),
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propagandists like Masterman, Parker, Brice, and Buchan
directed their propaganda work towards the civilian
population in Britain. On the military end, the War
Office directed their propaganda to speak to others in
uniform, more specifically the War Office dealt with the
enemy. Messinger also states that the British government
was blind to the potential that the use of propaganda■
posed. According to Messinger, Sir George Cockerill, head
of the Special Intelligence Section, was the first to
begin to analyze the propaganda literature that Germany
was distributing through the mail. British propaganda
organizations also acted as censors, like the CPI in the
United States. According to Peterson (1939), "The first
propaganda organization to be set in motion was that of
censorship. On August 5, 1914, the British cut the cables
between Germany and the United States." (p. 12) The
cutting of the cables allowed the British to restrict the
Germans most effective means of propaganda, the news.
Restricting the flow of information at this point in the
war was crucial because many people were forming opinions
about what was going on in Europe.
Propaganda is often used to provide information that
portrays the disseminator in the most positive light and
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portrays the opponent in a negative light. However, there
are other uses for propaganda.- According to Lasswell
(1971), "A large element in propaganda against the enemy
is the invention of ways and means for the transmission of
suggestions to the enemy." (p. 177) According to Bruntz
(1972), American pamphlets were also distributed to
soldiers on the German lines. These pamphlets claimed
that America was not fighting the German people, but the
German Autocrats and said that there would be peace once
the government was removed. America's wish during the war
was to protect people from the Kaiser and to protect
democracy. Bruntz also claims that American propagandists
would distribute thousands of postcards to the German
trenches, which had blanks for the finders to fill out in
case he was taken prisoner that the soldier could mail to
his relatives. Bruntz (1972) also said:
The significant fact is that the Allies seemed as 
busy discovering new ways to send paper "bullets" 
over the lines as they were at inventing new 
implements of warfare with which to fire bullets of 
steel at the enemy. Bullets are important, but so is 
a strong morale—a will to victory, (pp. 65-67)
Another method that was used during World War I was
propaganda of despair. Bruntz (1972) states that this was
the second phase of propaganda that was used by the Allied
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propagandists and that the leaflets' goal was to bring
despair to German soldiers. Soldiers were given leaflets
that claimed that they were in the fields.of death and
asked them why they were among the dead. He states that
the propaganda stated that:
It was futile, according to Allied propagandists, for 
the Germans to make further efforts to break the power 
of the Allies. The only result of these efforts would 
be death and the grave ... A great deal of
propaganda of despair had in it a touch of 
sentimentalism. It called attention to the suffering 
of the wives and children of the soldiers. (Bruntz, 
1972, p. 102-103)
Other methods of using despair in propaganda included
painting a picture of the rewards that awaited crippled
soldiers when they returned home, according to Bruntz.
The allies circulated stories about veterans of past wars
dying of hunger. Some leaflets depicted crippled soldiers
in front of hotels with rich and healthy (robust) patrons
coming out of restaurants and ignoring them.
The Allied forces were not the only ones distributing
information to enemy soldiers. According to Messinger
(1992) :
The Germans also undertook a propaganda offensive 
against enemy troops. The Gazette des Ardennes was 
an example. This illustrated, French-language 
newspaper was distributed over enemy lines by balloon 
and aeroplane. It was read with interest by many
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troops, particularly because the Germans cleverly 
included information on French prisoners, (p. 17)
Messinger also claims that Germany distributed information
in Russian in some areas of the eastern front and
information was provided in English for Americans who were
traveling through Germany and Austria.
During World War I, German use of propaganda was very
extensive. According to Messinger (1992) the German press
was organized for the war effort. The domestic press was
provided with lists weekly of topics that were not to be
covered and given advice about attitudes that should be
adopted regarding subjects that were sensitive. The
circulation of these papers included countries like
Switzerland, Holland, and Scandinavia. German embassies
in neutral countries supported the publication of
newspapers in German and the local language.
Hollywood Film Propaganda During WWI
According to Fyne (1994) Hollywood propaganda began
to be used before the beginning of the Spanish-American
war. On April 21, 1898 entrepreneurs of the film
industry, J. Stuart Blackton and Albert E. Smith, watched
people celebrating and waving the American flag in the
streets when Congress declared war against Spain and got
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the idea for a film. As a result, the pair created
Tearing Down the Spanish Flag, which depicted the U.S.
Army's capture of the installation in Havana, even though
the event had not happened yet. During World War I, Fyne
also claims that in Hollywood propagandists took advantage
of the opportunity to create films depicting the Germans
in an unfavorable light. These films portrayed the German
"Huns" as barbarians that were uncivilized and depraved.
Two titles were The Hun Within and To Hell with the
Kaiser. By the time the war had ended in 1918, audiences
in America were exposed to dozens of silent propaganda
movies that justified the war. In Russia, film was used
to overcome the language and education barriers and
promote the position of the Bolsheviks and Lenin. One
early example of this was a film that used the familiar
figure of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a person that even
illiterate Russians could identify. In 1925, Russian
propagandists also produced The Battleship Potemkin, which
justified the Bolshevik Revolution. Other Russian
propaganda films included Mother, The End of St.
Petersburg, and Storm over Asia.
Not all propaganda films during WWI portrayed war in
a favorable light. The movie All Quiet on the Western
24
Front was pacifist. It displayed German soldiers in a
different light from how they had previously been
portrayed in films. The movie did not portray the
glorious battle scenes, but isolation and death:
The clean cut-cut, young German soldiers, fresh from 
their local gymnasiums, resembled any American fellow 
walking down Main Street, hand in hand with his 
steady girl. In their native way, these German lads 
sought only friendship and romance, two pursuits that 
were interrupted when the Kaiser's call to arms 
dropped them on the European charnel fields. (Fyne, 
1994, p. 6)
World War II
Adolf Hitler was perhaps the most successful at using
propaganda to achieve his objectives. Hitler's use of
propaganda was so successful that the German people were
convinced that Jews and other groups were inferior to the
Aryan race. Hitler acknowledged the power of propaganda
in war efforts. According to Adolf Hitler:
arguably the greatest fan of British WWI propaganda, 
stridently believed that the British secured military 
victory primarily because of the effective propaganda 
campaigns the government launched on their own 
citizens throughout the war. (Hitler 1943,cited in 
Finch, 2000, p. 373)
Winkler (1978) commented on Germany's skill in the use of
propaganda during World War II. According to Winkler, no
American propagandist could match the power of the German
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Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Goebbels exerted
total control over radio, the press, and other forms of
expression in the Nazi state. He viewed propaganda as a
means to control every aspect of life. He also adopted
Hitler's view that the ability of the masses to understand
information was very limited and they must be provided
with slogans over and over again. All propaganda under
Goebbels appealed to German citizen's instincts and
emotions, not their rational processes.
Finch (2000) also stated that during war, propaganda
through radio broadcasts was the most effective at
planting a seed of mistrust in political leaders. During
World War II the Japanese used announcer Tokyo Rose on
radio broadcasts to undermine the morale of Australian
citizens by naming supposed targets in rural towns.
Hitler used radio and short wave radio to spread
propaganda as well. According to Childs and Whitton
(1942), "... Hitler's armed forces wrought an equally
striking transformation upon American public opinion. By
the end of June, only a minority of the American people
thought England and France could win." (p. 98)
America also used radio to spread propaganda during
this period. According to Horten (2002), however, there
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were- several factors that limited the effects of this
propaganda:
. whereas the networks eagerly collaborated with 
the government propaganda agencies and tried to 
remain in good standing with the FCC, they certainly 
did not risk disputing their regular, profitable 
prime-time schedules. The second factor that limited 
the effectiveness of this radio propaganda certainly 
had to do with America's legacies—from both World War 
I and the New Deal. As some letters and opinion 
polls amply certified, Americans did not swallow 
government propaganda hook, line, and sinker, (p. 63)
In Nazi Germany, the government used propaganda to
instill fear. In particular the swastika was used to
incite fear. However, the swastika is not necessarily
inherently fear-provoking. According to Heller (2004):
Of course not. everyone who lived under the Nazi 
symbol was afraid of its powers. To the contrary, 
millions were emboldened by it. The ancient mark 
symbolized good fortune of the German people to have 
leader who rekindled their collective greatness. Yet 
in order to do so he instilled in the majority fear 
of his minority enemies through regular propaganda 
blitzes, (p. 850)
Heller (2004) claims that one weapon of hate that was used
by the Nazi's was Der Stiirmer (The Stormer) . This weekly
newspaper, which was anti-Semetic, was produced by the
Nuremberg war criminal Julius Streicher. . The paper
covered the "crimes" of the Jews, which Included ritual
murder and savage rape. On the bottom of the publication
the motto, "The Jew Is Our Misery," was printed. The
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masthead lettering of the newspaper was black and spikey.
The sole purpose of the newspaper was to slander the
"mongrel" Jewish population. Heller states, "Fear
triggers hatred and inflames ignorance, which the skilled
propagandists converts into manifestations of terror." (p.
854) .
In 1942 the United States used images of the Japanese
demon, which had bucked-teeth and four eyes. Heller also
suggests uses of grotesque images such as these were just 
as powerful as if the allies had dropped bombs. According
to Heller, "Extreme caricatures of the Japanese like these
plumbed the depths of fear." (p. 854) Goebbels also used
the fear of defeat in his propaganda efforts. Bramsted
(1965) states:
Another propaganda line pursued in this period did 
not dwell upon victory but rather on the sinister 
spectre of defeat. "Strength through Fear" could 
only be gained by producing the nightmarish image of 
the deeds the enemy would commit should Germany be 
defeated. Fear of this dreadful possibility was to 
make the last German man and woman prefer to die 
stoically than to live as a slave under a foreign 
yoke. (p. 316)
According to Winkler (1978), the Office of War
Information (OWI) was formed by an executive order in June
of 1942 six months after the United States entered the war
to manage propaganda. Winkler (1978) states that:
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6OWI found itself in an awkward position from the very 
beginning. The first difficulties stemmed from the 
public fears of propaganda that emerged soon after 
World War I, lingered on for decades, and never 
really died away. (p. 1)
According to Winkler (1978), one of the main reasons for
the public fear of propaganda was George Creel's tendency
towards using overstatement and arguments that were
"acrimonious."
During World War II, some of the OWI's propaganda
publications were aimed at America's blacks. Winkler
stated that the propaganda pamphlet Negroes and the War
explained to Negroes what they had to lose under Hitler.
The pamphlet showed blacks as soldiers and civilians in
war work and other types of employment. The pamphlet
depicted the accomplishments of Negroes and was meant to
quell the doubts of many blacks about the war.
Music was used during World War II to distribute
propaganda. One group that was targeted by American WWII 
propaganda songs was the Japanese. According to Moon
(2003) :
These songs illustrate how popular culture served as 
government propaganda and helped codify preexisting 
cultural assumptions about the Japanese to mobilize 
the American people for the war effort. They also 
drew upon a long lineage of racist thought, primarily 
about African Americans and applied to the Japanese, 
using music as a method of dissemination." (p. 333)
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Moon (2004) claims that a survey taken in 1942 showed that
the majority of those surveyed believed that the Japanese
were treacherous. Anti-Japanese propaganda songs also
used notions that were popular about Japanese religious
practices and their racial inferiority, as well imagery of
children and animals appeared in anti-Japanese songs.
Moon also states that:
To propagate and tap into these sentiments, the 
federal government pressured the music industry to 
produce patriotic music, including songs that dealt 
with the Japanese. Government officials understood 
the power of music and were interested in using it to 
mobilize the American people to support the war.
(Moon, 2004, p. 335)
One anti-Japanese song capitalized on the notion that the
Japanese were child like and needed to be disciplined.
One such song was by Jenkins and Feagin in 1942 called
Spanking the Jap, whose lyrics included:
What is that rap rap rap!
That's uncle Spanking, the Jap
He would not listen to uncle's plea
So uncle put him across his knee . . . (p. 339)
Another mass medium that was used to distribute
propaganda by the Germans during the Second World War was
the newsreel. According to Bowles (2004), the production
of newsreels was a top priority for the German army's
Propaganda Abteilung in the German occupied zone of
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France. The name under which the newsreels appeared in
France was the Actualities Mondiales (AM) . Bowles (2004)
states that the AM:
Produced by UFA, Germany's largest state-supported 
film conglomerate, and distributed through a French 
subsidiary called the Alliance Cinematographique 
Europeene, the AM pushed French audiences to face the 
reality of their country's defeat and to accept the 
occupation—not in the name of ideological solidarity 
with the Nazis, but as a matter of necessity and self 
interest, (p. 47)
Bowles (2004) claims, "Such scenes were meant to persuade
French spectators that German victory in the war was
inevitable, and acquiescence the only viable option to
ensure French national survival." (p. 48)
As evidenced by this section and the previous one, use
of propaganda during times of war can be widespread.
However, there are those who opposed the use of
propaganda. There was one man in particular that opposed
American use of propaganda, Senator J.W. Fulbright.
According to Cone (2005) , Fulbright was concerned that
propaganda would become a standard procedure of the United
States government during peace time do well as during war.
Cone (2005) claims that:
Fulbright made sure that antipropaganda criticism 
became a recurring theme in Congress. Throwing the 
full weight and authority of his position behind his 
cause, he worked to raise public awareness about
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covert and systematic government propaganda campaigns 
and their repercussions through hearings, speeches, 
televised interviews, and numerous publications, (p.' 
167)
According to Cone (2005), in 1941 Congress put heavy
restrictions on the OWI, due to the belief of some that
its propaganda practices violated the traditions of
democracy. Although Congress had suppressed the OWI,
Congress was also considering a bill which would
institutionalize propaganda in government. The bill would
provide Voice of America (VOA), America's international
propaganda radio station with permanent funding. Senator
Fulbright voted for the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948, which was
different from the VOA, in the hopes that his educational
exchange program would serve the same purpose as the pro-
American broadcasts of the VOA.
Senator J.W. Fulbright was not the only person during
WWII to oppose the use of propaganda. Well known author
George Orwell opposed government propaganda. According to
Kerr (2002), the matter of principle made Orwell unhappy
about his work with the British Broadcasting Company
(BBC). Although the BBC was a corporation and not a
government department, it was understood that radio would
have an very important role to play in propaganda once the
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war began in 1939. During WWII the company came under the
supervision of the Ministry of Information, which served
as a model for the Ministry of Truth in Orwell's work
1984 .
Hollywood Propaganda During WWII
During WWII, Fyne (1994) points out that President
Roosevelt felt that the use of films was the most
effective means of providing the public with information.
Many of the films after Pearl Harbor were B-titles. B-
title films were generally produced in a matter of weeks,
were usually about an hour long, and lacked
characterization. Fyne (2004) noted the Office of War
Information (OWI) was the "official watchdog" of the movie
industry, acting like a censor and monitoring the material
that was produced. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, many studios began to make propaganda
films. One such film was Wake Island. This film was
different than other B movies that were produced during
the time period according to Fyne. Wake Island was
created from the headlines of the time, skillfully
portraying the brave defense of Wake Island by the Marine
Corps:
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Paramount walked a tenuous line between fact and 
fiction. Naturally, the subplots were contrived, but 
the loss of the island was a staggering blow for 
America's morale. Hollywood, however, would 
manipulate that surrender into strong film
propaganda, containing every element necessary to 
motivate moviegoers to praise their country and laud 
the honor of its Marines, while debasing the bestial 
Japanese invaders. (Fyne, 1994, p. 33)
According to Koppes and Black (1987) one important
question that the OWI asked during this period of film
propaganda, was "Will this picture help win the war?"
Koppes and Black state that this question might seem
absurd, "But in that' grim year of 1943 propagandists as
well as film makers took the question with deep
seriousness." (p. 84)
Cold War
From the 1950's to the 1980's, the Cold War was
fought between the United States and Communist countries
such as Russia, Korea, and Vietnam. This particular war,
although fought on the battlefield in some aspects, such
as in Afghanistan in the 1980's, was primarily fought off
the battlefield. During this period, rumors of nuclear
arms proliferation by the Soviets abounded. During the
Cold War, both the United States and Russia, engaged in the
use of propaganda. According to Snyder (1995), "Far from
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concert and dance halls, in the mountains of Afghanistan,
U.S. government media gurus were training sheepherders to
be skilled TV cameramen so that they could chronicle the
nightmare of Soviet military occupation . . . " (p. xi)
Snyder also states that during this period, whatever
worked was fair game and that the government ran the
largest full-service public relations agency in the
country. Also concerned with getting their propaganda
message out, the Soviets would also plant false and
embarrassing stories about the United States in Russian
media. Snyder (1995) stated:
Probably the most bothersome Soviet press fabrication 
the entire cold war, charging the American government 
with developing the AIDS virus that would kill only 
blacks—an "ethnic weapon" as it would later be labled 
by the Soviets—initially appeared in India's pro- 
Soviet daily newspaper, Patriot, in 1983. The 
accusation hit a nerve because the CIA did maintain 
unauthorized stockpiles of paralytic shellfish 
toxins, cobra venom, and other biological poisons at 
an army laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, (p.
104)
In the early years of the Cold War anti-Communist 
propaganda was perhaps the most prevalent. According to
Barson and Heller (2001):
Just the word 'communism' was provocative enough to 
inspire a host of irrational laws and decrees.
People truly believed that Reds were under the bed— 
not to mention in the water supply, creeping through
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the halls of government, and even spying from space, 
(p. 8)
Anti-Communist propaganda in America during the Cold War
was so effective that the American public allowed the
government to persecute its .opponents. Although there
were many anti-Communist propaganda books and pamphlets
during the time in the United States, there were also
those that were produced by the government.
The Cold War period in America also saw its share of
anti-propaganda dissent. Senator Fulbright continued to
remain active during the "Red Scare" in America.
According to Cone (2005), "Above all, Fulbright feared
that an extremist demagogue like Hitler might rise to
power in America. In 1950, he feared that the success of
Sen. McCarthy's sordid anti-Communist frenzies might turn
nightmare into reality." (p. 169) Cone also states that
according to Fulbright, sources of the most dangerous
consensus-building propaganda were those whom he called
"super patriots." McCarthy's acts convinced him of this
fact. Fulbright was also opposed to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's "Crusade for Freedom," which duped Americans
into donating hundreds of thousands of "Truth Dollars."
The money that was donated by Americans was used to fund
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Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty, which. CIA funded
anti-Communist broadcasts. President Eisenhower, a
"propaganda fanatic," was compared to the "Ministry of
Truth" in George Orwell's 1984 by Senator Fulbright, who
denounced the President's program.
The Cold War was not only fought between the United
States and Russia, the British but between the British and
Russia. According to Deery (2004), there was within the
British Foreign Office a unit that activities were focused
on anti-Communist propaganda. This unit was called the
Information Research Department (IRD). Deery claims that
efficacy of the propaganda used by the IRD depended on the
correct use of political language:
Thus the IRD sought to put a 'spin' on the truth. It 
employed the weapon not of 'black' propaganda— 
strategically placed lies and false rumors, which 
remained the sanctuary of the foreign intelligence 
services—but of 'grey' propaganda (whereby 
deliberately slanted,' non attributable information 
was designed and disseminated). (Deery, 2004, p. 16)
the IRD worked to make sure that their propagandists,
broadcasters, journalists, and politicians used words and
phrases that were the most effective in their articles and
speeches. For instance, Deery (2004) claims that, "In
describing 'imperialism', the adjective 'Russian' was
preferred over 'Red' because the latter had 'favourable
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associations'." (p. 17) The IRD preferred, to use such
terms as "Czar" and "Knout," which worked well with lines
that harped on "barbaric," and "backward."
Hollywood Propaganda During the Cold War
During the Cold War period in America, many citizens
feared the advance of Communism. During the 1950s it was
common for schools to have drills to prepare children for
the possibility of nuclear war. Many Americans stockpiled
food and other supplies and built bomb shelters in their
basements and backyards. Senator Joseph McCarthy is
perhaps best remembered for his crusade against Communism
in the United States. Many people in the entertainment
industry were blacklisted because they were suspected of
being a Communist. This fear was also capitalized on by
the Hollywood film industry. Numerous films about
Communism were made during the Cold War period. Some- of
these films include Yankee Go Home: Communist Propaganda,
Anarchy U.S. A, Kennedy's Cold War: Keeping the Commies
Covered, Mao's Little Red Video, and Communists on Campus.
After examining the literature about propaganda
during periods of war and conflict, it becomes evident
that the use of propaganda is not restricted to any one
country. To the contrary, the use of propaganda has been
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widely used by the United States, Britain, and Germany.
Propaganda is perhaps one of the strongest weapons that a
government can use during times of war and conflict to
convince its citizens that the very war or conflict is not
only necessary, but support of it makes those citizens
patriots. Before the United States entered the WWI,
Britain distributed propaganda aimed at convincing
American public that supporting the war effort was the
right thing to do. Once the country entered the war,
President Wilson and the CPI distributed information
claiming that it was American's patriotic duty to support
the war. During WWII Hitler and the Nazi party used
propaganda to convince Germans that Jewish people were
inferior, thieves, rapists, and that they should be
eradicated. The United States used the same dehumanizing
tactics in their propaganda against Japan, portraying the
Japanese as either little children to be disciplined or
monsters. The Cold War Period and its use of anti­
communist propaganda led Americans to build bomb shelters
and created a Salem-like witch hunt for Communists-by the
United States Senate, which was led by Senator McCarthy.
Theoretical Perspectives
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As discussed in the Introduction, three theoretical
perspectives are used to explain rhetoric and propaganda.
These perspectives include: 1. The Communication Model, 2.
Persuasive Appeals, and 3. Agenda Setting Theory. The end
of this chapter will be used to describe how the •
aforementioned theoretical perspectives apply to the use
of rhetoric and propaganda during World War I, World War
II, and the Cold War.
The Communication Model or the Transactional
Communication perspective can be used to describe all of
the rhetoric and propaganda during World War I, World War
II, and the Cold War. Each of the examples of the
propaganda that was used by the United States, Great
Britain, Germany or Russia demonstrates that the message
contained in the message was very important. For
instance, When World War I began in Europe in 1914; the
United States did not enter the conflict until three years
after the conflict began. However, once President Wilson
declared war, the messages that the CPI distributed were
developed to create American support of the war effort.
Many messages of the'time frame led American's to believe
that it was their patriotic duty to support the war
effort. At the start of the war, Great Britain also
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distributed messages to the American public which stressed
that the war was in fact just and necessary. The
propaganda distributed by Great Britain also encouraged
the United States to join the War on the side of the
Allies. In Germany and its occupied territories, tight
control was exerted over the messages available to the
public. The domestic press was given lists of weekly
topics that they were not to discuss.
Propagandists use many of the primary and secondary
emotions that were described in Chapter One to persuade.
One of the most commonly used persuasive appeals in
rhetoric and propaganda during the time periods discussed
in the chapter was that of fear. The best example of
propaganda appealing to the fear of the public was in Nazi
Germany. Much of the propaganda that was distributed by
the Nazi's during World War II encouraged German citizens
to fear Jewish people. Nazi propaganda resorted to the
use of fear to convince the German people that the Jews
were barbarians that sought to rape and steal from the
citizens of the "Motherland." The United States also made
use of this tactic when referring to the Japanese during
World War II. Propaganda portrayed the Japanese as
someone that American's should fear. Just as the Nazi's
41
were doing in Germany, the United States spread the image
that Japanese were inhuman creatures that should be
feared. This is evidenced by propaganda that depicted
Japanese as buck-toothed attackers.
During World War I, the Allies used despair (sadness)
against German soldiers. The Allies would distribute
leaflets over enemy lines that claimed that they were in
fields of death. The leaflets challenged the soldiers by
asking them why they were among the dead and encouraged
them to return home. Another popular appeal to despair
that was used by the Allies, was painting a grim picture
of what awaited German soldiers when they returned home
from the battlefield. This type of propaganda told the
soldiers that when they returned home, they would be
ignored by the rich and would be left to starve. Pictures 
were distributed that depicted crippled soldiers watching
wealthy and robust Germans leaving restaurants and
ignoring their countrymen that had fought for them.
According to Campbell et. al. (2000), Agenda Setting
theory tells us what to think about. The theory also
states that the media concentrates on a few issues and
subjects then lead the public to believe that these issues
are more important than others. A good example of agenda
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setting by the Media was during WWII in Great Britain.
When WWII began, the BBC understood that it would have a
role to play in the war effort. The BBC came under the
supervision of Ministry of Information during the war.
The BBC and George Orwell took part in the propaganda
effort and agenda setting by providing information that
encouraged India to remain loyal to Britain despite the
fact that they were being provided with German propaganda.
Although controlled by the Germans, the film reels that
were shown in occupied zone, such as France, were also an
example of agenda setting, be it an example of agenda
setting by government controlled media. The newsreels
forced French audiences to accept their defeat and
occupation. The films also encouraged the French to align
their ideology with that of the Nazi's as a matter of not 
only necessity, but self interest. The films were a way
for the Nazi's to shape the reality of the French in the
occupied zones.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
The goal of this project was to identify what events
led this country from September 11, 2001 to the beginning
of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003. Data for the
project was obtained in a variety of ways. The first
method was to examine descriptions of actual events 
between September 11th and the war in Iraq. Additional 
methods for obtaining secondary data included examining
interviews, detailed accounts of the events that took
place, magazines, and journal articles.
I also looked at how the "neoconservatives" of the
Bush Administration talked about the need for war. The
neoconservatives of the Bush Administration are Paul
Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard
Cheney. I also looked at materials produced to lend
support for attacking Iraq including how the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and the White Paper were used
in the propaganda effort. Newspaper articles were
examined for common themes to identify possible propaganda
distributed by the Bush Administration. The context in
which the statements or references to intelligence were
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examined to determine the role they played in the events
that led to war. r
Critical rhetorical analysis was used to analyze the
rhetoric and propaganda of the Bush Administration.
According to Howard (n.d.) on the Syracuse University's
website, a critical response is not like when we might
criticize one of our close friends. Howard claims,
"Rather, it is a matter of one scholar evaluating the work
of another scholar." The website noted, that this type of
critique is not inherently negative in nature. So in
essence, this project evaluated the rhetoric of the Bush
Administration.
Critical rhetorical analysis makes use of
qualitative, interpretive research methods to analyze
rhetorical texts. According to the
Psychological/Sociological Paradigms developed by Burrell
and Morgan (1979), the radical structuralist paradigm,
recognizes a subjective perspective and is the viewpoint
applied in the project. The Paradigm focuses on drastic
change, liberation, and potentiality. The radical
structuralist paradigm also emphasizes that over-throwing
or rising above the limitations of existing social
arrangements is important. This method allows the
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rhetoric and propaganda leading to the war to be examined
to determine how it was being used to limit the
Administration and the American public.
Foss (2004) provides a definition of rhetorical
criticism. Foss claims, "It is a qualitative research
method that is designed for the systematic investigation
and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts for the
purpose of understanding rhetorical processes." (p. 6)
According to Foss' (2004) definition, rhetorical criticism
consists of three principal dimensions. These dimensions
include, "(1) systematic analysis as the act of criticism;
(2) acts and artifacts as the objects of analysis in
criticism, (3) understanding rhetorical process as the
purpose of criticism." (p. 6)
A critical rhetorical analysis provided the
researcher with the opportunity to examine the texts
examined in the project from a more subjective
perspective.
According to Brummet (1994), the job of a good
rhetorical critic is to show people how they should think
about certain things and find meaning in them. Good
rhetorical criticism should also be liberating. Brummet
(1994) asserts that, "It liberates you, the critic,
46
because it gives you the chance to probe into and develop
some of these other potential ways of experiencing and
understanding." (p. 77) According to Brummet (1994) it is
also necessary that good rhetorical criticism liberate
readers and listeners alike as they share the new insights
that the critic has gained. Rhetorical criticism is also
judged on the basis of the insight it provides into the
effects of popular culture on society, and whether or not
it expands the options available for society to experience
that influence. Brummet (1994) also states that:
The critic is not only concerned about power; he or 
she is interventionist as well. The critic has some 
purpose or goal in mind in doing rhetorical
criticism—as we noted before, the critic is on a 
mission. That means that for the critic, judgment of 
the text is inevitable and unavoidable. Judgment 
runs throughout all the insights offered by the 
critic. In suggesting that a text means this or 
that, the critic Is also judging it. . . Objectivity
is not possible for the rhetorical critic, (p. 102)
According to Foss (2004), the study of rhetorical
criticism involves the study of symbols. Foss asserts
that by practicing and studying rhetorical criticism, we
become able to comprehend and articulate what it is that
we like or dislike about something by investigating the
symbols. The study of rhetorical criticism permits the
ability to become more refined and selective in our
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explanation, investigation, and comprehension of symbols
and our responses to them.
Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland (1994), claim that the
primary purpose of a critic of rhetoric is to speak or
write to a particular audience and have an effect on the
thoughts and acts of that audience. Nothstine et. al.
(1994) also claim that each critic of rhetoric chooses an
rhetorical event from an infinite amount of rhetorical
events, which implies that the community the critic is a
part of should pay special attention to the rhetorical
event that is being addressed because it was chosen over
other rhetorical events. Nothstine et. al. (1994) assert:
Thus the critic implies, by the choice of texts, that 
the chosen text is more significant than others for 
some reason. This does not mean that critics always 
must choose the most recent, obvious, newsworthy, 
prominent, historically influential, artful, famous, 
or infamous text to study, (p. 5)
Nothstine et. al. (1994) posit that rhetorical criticism
must be prepared to respond to the concerns and the well
being of the community in which it resides. This also
means that critics of rhetoric should be prepared to speak
to and within the communities in which they reside.
Nothstine et. al. (1994) also suggest that critics be
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prepared to deal with those who challenge with or pass
judgment on their work.
Limitations of the Project
The major limitation of this project was the
inability to conduct primary research. Due to time
limitations and budget restraints, it was not possible to
conduct interviews with persons involved in the topic
under investigation. Primary research would have provided
the opportunity to learn how the American public responded
t
to the rhetoric and the propaganda of the Bush
Administration. Although it was not feasible to obtain
primary data, there was an abundance of secondary data on
the subject under investigation. This became a limitation
because it was necessary to condense the information that
was available. The research conducted for the project
also relied heavily on the use of interpretive,
qualitative research. The use of interpretive research
resulted in the project being more subjective than
objective in nature.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
As stated in Chapter One, the purpose of this project
was to answer two questions. The first question this
project attempted to answer "Was what rhetorical event(s)
allowed President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq?"
The second question the project attempted to answer was
"How did the Bush Administration manage the crises that
developed as a result of these rhetorical events and
situations?" Thus, the chapter will be divided in to two
sections. The first section will examine the rhetorical
events that led this country from September 11, 2001 to
the beginning of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003 and the
crises that developed as a result of those rhetorical
events. The second section of the chapter will examine
how the Bush Administration managed the crises that
developed in response to the rhetorical events and
situations that occurred.
Rhetorical Events Leading to the War In Iraq
September 11, 2001 is a day that won't soon be
forgotten by most Americans. Many of us watched the World
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Trade Center Towers becoming towering infernos in the New
York skyline and then watched in horror as they crumbled
to the ground and sent people fleeing for their lives.
Others will remember the smoking wreckage at the Pentagon
or the plane that crashed in the fields of Pennsylvania,
which never reached the terrorists' intended destination.
Soon after these horrifying events in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., the American public
learned who was responsible for the terrorist attacks.
The name of the group, Al Qaeda, and its leader, Osama bin
Laden. Not long after this revelation by the Bush
Administration, American troops began their advance into
the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. Their mission was
to hunt down bin Laden, members of his terrorist
organization, and remove the leaders of that country (The
Taliban) from power because of their support of Al Qaeda.
To most Americans, this was clearly justified because it
was clear that the Taliban supported Al Qaeda. It was
also clear that there was a direct connection to Al Qaeda 
and the events of September 11th.
However, the pre-emptive war that was launched
against Iraq was not clearly tied to the events of 
September 11th. The question then becomes, how did this
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country move from bombing the mountains of Afghanistan to
invading Iraq?
To answer this question, it is necessary to provide
some background information on events that took place in 
this country pre-September 11th. The path that led the 
United States to the current war in Iraq began soon after
the first conflict in Iraq (Desert Storm) ended.
According to Burrough, Peretz, Rose, and Wise (2004), the
war in Iraq:
took root after President George H.W. Bush's decision 
to end the 1991 Gulf War abruptly, to pull back the 
troops that were slaughtering Iraqi soldiers by the 
thousands, and to end the headlong rush north toward 
Baghdad. During the 1990's the notion of toppling 
Saddam's regime was championed by a circle of 
neoconservative thinkers, led by Richard Perle, a 
former assistant secretary of defense for
international security policy under President Reagan, 
and Paul Wolfowitz, an undersecretary of defense for 
policy for George H.W. Bush, (p.232)
Burrough et. al. (2004) assert that after George H.W. Bush
left office, the "neoconservatives" tried to convince the
Clinton Administration that it might one day be faced with
the possibility of taking military action to prevent other
regimes from the development or use of WMD. A letter was
drafted in 1992 by Wolfowitz and called the Defense
Planning Guidance. The letter was given to President
Clinton in 1998 by Perle, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and 15
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others urging that there was a need, for a regime change in
Iraq and a. more aggressive policy in the Middle East.
According to Buchanan (2004) the letter that
requested a policy change and the ousting of Saddam
Hussein was the, "aim of American foreign policy."
Buchanan also asserts that, ". . . the signers all
pledged, they would offer [their] full support in this
difficult but necessary endeavor. " (p. 46) Buchanan also
asserts that the letter claimed that in the first part of
the 21st century, the security of the world would be 
determined by how the President chose to deal with the
threat.
Although the neoconservatives provided Clinton with
the letter requesting the President's support in removing 
Saddam Hussein from power, the plan had been created five
years before it was shown to Clinton. According to
Bamford (2004), "Ironically, the plan was originally
intended not for Bush but for another world leader,
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu." (p. 261) The
plan claimed that the removal of Hussein from power was
the first step in making the Middle East into a region
that was friendly to Israel instead of hostile and
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signaled a departure from the former policy of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which was peace oriented.
It is important to clarify exactly what or rather who
neoconservatives (or sometimes referred to as neocons)
are. According to Buchanan (2004), "The first generation
(of neoconservatives) were ex-Trotskyites, socialists,
leftists, and liberals who backed FDR, Truman, JFK, and
LBJ." (p. 37) Buchanan also states that these
neoconservatives began to shift their focus when McGovern
captured the democratic party nomination for president in
1972, whose platform was to cut defense and for Americans
to come home from Vietnam. According to Buchanan, the
supporters drifted over to the Republican Party and became
conservatives, which culminated in the triumph of Reagan.
Huband (2004) states that the neoconservatives were
waiting in the wings when President Bush gave his
infamous, "axis of evil," State of the Union Address in
2003, "Cheerleading,, or perhaps leading, in reality was
the group of right-wing republicans led by Wolfowitz, who
had long been preparing for the return to office of an
administration they could mold in their own image." (cited
in Huband 2004, pp. 130-131) The neoconservatives banded
together during the Clinton Administration, sharing their
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views and eventually emerged as the Project for the New
American Century (PNAC) on June 3, 1997. Disillusioned by
the incoherence of the policies of the Administration,
this led them to the conclusion there were four pressing
imperatives. According to Huband (2004), the imperatives
were:
® we need to increase defense spending 
significantly if we are to carry out our global 
responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces 
for the future;
® we need to strengthen our ties to democratic 
allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our 
interests and values;
• we need to promote the cause of political and 
economic freedom abroad;
® we need to accept responsibility for America's 
unique role in preserving and extending an
■ international order friendly to our security, our 
prosperity and our principles, (p. 131)
According to Pilger (2002), Perle, one of the
founding fathers of the PNAC, believed the following about
the war on terrorism:
All this talk about first we are going to do 
Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq . . . this is 
entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let 
our vision of the world go forth, and we embrace it 
entirely and we don't try to piece together a clever 
diplomacy, but just wage a total war . . . our
children will sing great songs about us years from 
now. (p. 13)
After the September 11th attacks, President Bush 
showed hesitation when the subject of invading Iraq was
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brought up by other members of the Administration. The
President needed to be persuaded more to believe that
Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United
States and that he was producing WMDs. According to
Burrough et. al. (2004), when the President was confronted
about the situation in Iraq, he would often respond,
"Protect my flexibility." (p.234) Although President Bush
was unsure of his stance on Iraq,- the Vice President was
clear about where he stood and his position. According to
the Register-Guard (2004):
Dick Cheney, wields unprecedented influence over 
domestic and foreign policy in the White House—so 
much influence that some administration critics have 
suggested that the vice president is, take your pick, 
A) a co-president or B) a puppet master who controls 
his titular boss. (p. A12)
The Register-Guard claims that it was clear in the hours 
following September 11th that Cheney was at the hub of 
decision making and his actions led to the decision to 
invade Iraq without U.N. support or anything that
resembled long-range planning for the postwar phase. The
Register-Guard also states, "... Cheney, not Rice was
framing choices and functioning as de facto national
security adviser—just as Cheney supplanted the authority
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of others, including Central Intelligence Agency Director
George Tenet." (p. A12)
It became apparent that the rhetoric of the members
of his Administration was beginning to change the
President's mind about invading Iraq in the months
following the attacks. According to Burrough et. al.
(2004), British Prime Minister Tony Blair reminded
President Bush to remember what his priorities were.
Blair believed that the President needed to deal with Al
Qaeda, Afghanistan, and the Taliban. President then
pushed the Iraq issue by stating, "I agree with you, Tony.
We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with
Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq." (p. 238)
The first indication of the impending war with Iraq
and the public rhetoric of the Bush Administration came in
2001 according to Mann (2004) . Mann states that in
November of that year, the focus of the administration
began to shift from the war in Afghanistan, which was in
its last stages to terrorists acquiring WMDs. Mann
states, "On the surface the administration was offering
merely one more rationale for the war on terrorism . . .
the administration's new stress on weapons of mass
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destruction was the earliest sign of a far broader
campaign." (p. 317)
The rhetoric for going to war with Iraq began almost 
immediately after September 11th. Bamford (2004) states 
that it was apparent from notes written by Rumsfeld, that
the attacks on the United States would be used as pretext
in pushing a war against Hussein. According to Bamford,
". . . Rumsfeld wanted to 'hit S.H. at the same time.' The
idea was to 'sweep' him up, whether 'related' to 9/11 or
'not.' Wolfowitz had the same idea and quickly began
talking up an Iraqi connection in conference calls with
other officials, including Cheney." (p. 285) Bamford
(2004) also states that almost immediately after the
terrorist attacks a secret intelligence unit was formed by
David Wurmser, which went against normal channels and
reported directly to Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy. The intelligence unit was given the
name Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. Bamford
further asserts that those who were brought together to
form the intelligence unit lacked experience:
He (Gregory Thielmann) said the makeup of the 
intelligence unit was a giveaway, indicating that 
they had no interest in true analysis . . . There's
no logical explanation for the office's creation 
except that they [the Bush Administration] wanted
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people to find evidence to support their answers 
about war. (Bamford, 2004, p. 290)
Lt. Col Karen Kwiatowski, agreed with Thielmann, saying
the unit was providing propaganda and not intelligence.
Bamford claims the purpose of Wurmser's group was to
contribute to the rhetoric of the Bush Administration.
Bamford describes the unit as essentially a pro-war
propaganda cell, which produced evidence supporting the
pretexts for attacking Iraq.
Another supplier of intelligence and propaganda
according to Bamford (2004) was Ahmad Chalabi and the
Iraqi National Congress (INC). Bamford states that, "'The
[INC's] intelligence isn't reliable at all,' said Vincent
Cannistraro, the CIA's former chief of counterterrorism.
'Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the
Defense Department what they want to hear.'" (p. 294) 
According to Burrough et. al. (2004), Chalabi's family had
fled Iraq in 1958. The INC, an exile group which was
based in London, supplied- the United States with
intelligence that had either been proven suspect or
fabricated by the CIA.
According to Corn (2003), "The Bush strategy was
clear: hype the threat presented by Iraq, exaggerate and
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embellish. Overstate Hussein's potential as a menace to
America; overstate his ties to al Qaeda." (p. 219)
Wolfowitz was one person within the Bush Administration
who used the strategy. According to Burrough et. al.
(2004), Wolfowitz also claimed that there was a 10 to 50
percent chance that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. According to Woodward 
(2004), . . Wolfowitz had edgy, hawkish views. The
reasons for getting rid of Saddam were: It was necessary
and it would be relatively easy." (p. 21) Woodward
further asserts that Wolfowitz believed that it would be
possible for the United States to send the military to
overrun and confiscate Iraq's southern oil wells. In the
days after the attacks, Wolfowitz and-the other
neoconservatives would not stop their quest for war in
Iraq. The ideas that the neoconservatives presented as
"draft plans." Woodward also claimed:
"The only strong advocate for' attacking Iraq at that 
point was Wolfowitz, who thought war in Afghanistan 
was dicey and uncertain ... In contrast, Iraq was a 
brittle oppressive regime that might break easily 
with an opposition yearning to topple Saddam." (p.
26)
The Bush Administration also based much of its
rhetoric supporting the war in Iraq on the premise that
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Iraq had an alleged agreement to purchase uranium from
Niger. According to Bamford (2004), much of the
information was based on letters that had been obviously
blended together from several older documents that were
genuine. The phony documents from Niger were created from
letters that had been stolen from the Nigerien embassy in
Rome on January 2, 2001. The intention of the documents
was to create the impression that Iraqi ambassador Wissam
al-Zahawiah's trip to Niger in 1999, was to arrange for a
shipment of uranium to Iraq in 2000. The documents also
implied that the ambassador might have something to do 
with the attacks on September 11th.
One of the final instances of rhetoric of the Bush
Administration before the war began in Iraq was a result
of the discovery of aluminum tubes. One of the key
allegations the Bush Administration used to promote the
war was Iraq's capability to produce WMDs. According to
Burrough et. al. (2004), in the fall of 2001 a delivery of
aluminum tubes from China was intercepted on its way to
Iraq en route to Jordan. It was thought by officials in
the administration that the tubes were going to be used
like centrifuges to spin uranium at high speeds so that it
could be used in the production of Nuclear weapons.
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Although Thielmann was not convinced, then Director
General of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet
was sure that the tubes were meant for that purpose.
The rhetoric of the Bush Administration culminated in
2002 when President Bush delivered his State of the Union
Address to the country. According to Burrough et. al.
(2004), the man who wrote the address, David Frum, was
directed by Michael Gerson to make the best case for war
with Iraq. During the speech, the phrase "axis of evil"
was coined to describe Iran, North Korea, and Iraq.
According to President Bush (2002) :
States like these and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, 
giving them the means to match their hatred. They 
could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the 
United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic, (cited in 
Burrough et. al., 2004, p. 240)
Burrough et. al. further claim that the President would go
on to say that the administration would be prepared to
strike pre-emptive wars so that it would not allow the
world's most dangerous regimes to threaten America with
the world's most dangerous weapons.
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Crises That Developed as A Result of The 
Rhetoric of The Bush Administration
One crisis that developed as a result of the rhetoric
of the Bush Administration was the pressure that was
placed on CIA intelligence officers charged with finding 
evidence that Iraq had been involved with September 11th 
and that the country had WMDs. According to Burrough et.
al. (2004) :
many Administration officials reacted strongly, 
negatively, and aggressively when presented with 
information that contradicted what they already 
believed about Iraq . . . Intelligence officers who
presented analyses that were at odds with pre­
existing views of senior Administration officials 
were subject to barrages of questions and requests 
for additional information, (p. 242)
Burrough et. al. (2004) claim that CIA analysts were often
urged by their superiors to provide evidence that Iraq
possessed WMDs. When the analysts submitted papers that
lacked proof of their existence, they often felt pressure
from their supervisors who were constantly questioning
about why they chose a certain piece of information over
another. Basically the CIA analysts were being
interrogated and asked to defend their findings.
The major crisis that developed was a result of the
rhetoric of the Bush Administration using the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) as the basis for the White
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Paper. As mentioned previously, the Administration
believed that Iraq was attempting to purchase uraniuhi from
Niger to make WMDs. According to Burrough et. al. (2004),
in the fall of 2001 a delivery of aluminum tubes from
China that were to be delivered to Iraq were intercepted
en route to Jordan. It was believed that the tubes were
to be used as centrifuges to spin uranium at high speeds
so that it might be used in the production of nuclear
weapons. Greg Thielmann of the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and a scientist from the Department of
Energy were not convinced. However George Tenet, then
Director of the CIA, was sure that the tubes were meant to
be used as centrifuges. Burrough et. al. (2004) claimed
that based partially on the tube evidence, the CIA created
the NIE. The NIE, a 90-page document, is the highest form
of reporting that can be done by the United States
intelligence community. According to the document, the
tubes were strong evidence that Saddam Hussein was
reinstating the uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's
nuclear weapons program.
Burrough et. al. (2004) further asserts that the NIE
was deemed to be insufficient by Congress to deliberate on
the subject of the country remaining at war or peace. In
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order to come to a decision about whether or not Hussein
was an imminent threat, Congress and the American people
needed to be provided with a document they could read.
The CIA was asked to provide a White Paper or a condensed
version of the NIE document. It was the request of the
Congress to create the document that led to the
development of a crisis for the Bush Administration.
Burrough et. al. (2004) also claims that when the CIA was
asked to provide the White Paper, not only was the
original document condensed, but facts from the original
document were distorted to create an even greater threat
to the United States. Evaluations that were cautious in
the NIE turned in to statement of fact and conclusions
were not just abbreviated, but completely revised in the
white paper. The White Paper created a scary picture for
the United States and can be considered one of the
strongest pieces of evidence used to support the war in
Iraq.
Response of the Bush Administration
After all that has happened on the journey that led 
this country from September nth to the current war in 
Iraq, some might wonder how the Bush Administration
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responded, to these events once it was proven that there
was no definitive evidence proving the existence of WMD.
The overwhelming response of the Bush Administration after
the war in Iraq began was denial about the fact that they
had been wrong about the existence of WMDs. According to
Hersh (2004) :
There was, in contrast, little self-doubt or second- 
guessing in the Pentagon over the failure to 
immediately find the weapons. The Pentagon adviser 
to Special Plans told me in May 2003 that the delay 
"means nothing."(p. 241)
Hersh (2004) also states that they were waiting to hear
information from scientists that could provide the
Pentagon with information about where the weapons were.
Another Pentagon official who works for William Luti,
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, said that the weapons were hidden in
the mountains of Iraq or transferred to a friendly
country. President Bush himself also resorted to denial
when faced with accusations that information about Iraq
having WMDs was wrong and supported a report by David Kay,
which fell short of claims that there were WMDs.
According to Hersh (2004), the President felt vindicated
by the report and believed that it showed that Hussein was
a threat to the United States and a serious danger. Vice
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President Cheney also remained unfazed when the documents
from Niger were proven to be fakes. In an interview in
September 2003, Cheney claimed that a British dossier's
claimed that Iraq was attempting to obtain uranium from
Africa and that the Administration's previous beliefs had
been validated.
This chapter sought to answer two questions. The
first question that the chapter attempted to answer was
what rhetorical event(s) allowed President George W. Bush
to declare war on Iraq? The second question that the
chapter attempted to answer was how did the Bush
Administration manage the crises that developed in
response to these rhetorical events and situations?
After examining the rhetorical events that took place
in the Bush Administration after the terrorist attacks on
the United States, it becomes obvious how this country
moved from September 11, 2001 to. the first pre-emptive war
in the country's history being launched against Iraq. In
the days following the terrorist attacks, neoconservative
members of the Bush Administration including Donald
Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, began planting the idea that
Iraq was somehow supporting terrorists and had plans to
develop WMDs. The Bush Administration also obtained much
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of its evidence supporting the war in Iraq from phony
documents that were supposedly stolen from the Nigerien
embassy in Rome, which claimed that the Iraqi ambassador
had agreements with Niger to purchase uranium (used to
make nuclear weapons). One of the final rhetorical events 
that lead this country from September 11th to the current 
war in Iraq was the creation of the White Paper. The
White Paper, a condensed version of the NIE, distorted
many of the findings in the original NIE to make Iraq seem
like a more imminent threat than it actually was.
The overall response of the Bush Administration to
the rhetorical events and situations that occurred is
simple, denial. When faced with questions about WMDs and
why they had not been found in Iraq, the response of the
Bush Administration was that the weapons were in the
mountains or had been hidden in a friendly country. These
responses demonstrated that even if the Bush
Administration had failed to provide the American public
with definitive proof that Iraq had WMDs, they would not
admit they were wrong. If the Bush Administration
admitted that the war in Iraq had been based on shaky
evidence at best, they would be admitting that they had
sent many of this Nation's children to their death under
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false pretenses. It seems as if the Bush Administration
was working under the premise that they had the best of
intentions and they were justified in invading Iraq.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
After examining the rhetorical events that led this 
country from September 11th to the current war in Iraq, it 
becomes evident that some of the theoretical perspectives
discussed in chapter one and chapter two apply to the
situation under examination. The theoretical perspectives
that apply to these events are persuasive appeals and
agenda setting.
As noted previously, persuasive appeals are
categorized by both primary and secondary emotions. The
persuasive appeal that the rhetoric and propaganda of the
Bush Administration appeared to target the most was that
of fear. Just the mention of WMDs and all they entailed
was sufficient to instill fear in members of the
Administration and the American public. Members of the
Bush Administration used the fear appeals to convince the
President that Saddam Hussein was producing WMDs that
might possibly be used on the United States. Members of
the Administration used the falsified Nigerien documents
to plant the fear that Iraq had an agreement with Niger to
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purchase uranium ore, which was to be used in the
production of nuclear weapons. Fear was also used by the
Administration when it claimed that confiscated aluminum
tubes were going to be used by the Iraqis to spin uranium
at high speeds, a process that is involved in making
nuclear weapons. Another persuasive appeal that was used
by the neoconservatives of the PNAC was pride. The
neoconservatives took their pride and also their arrogance
in the democratic system and turned it in to a potential
opportunity to spread democracy throughout the Middle East
and make it a place with a more sympathetic regime, so
that they might further their own goals.
The second theoretical perspective that applies to
the rhetorical events that led this country to war is
agenda setting theory. Agenda setting involves the media
conveying the information to the public that it feels is
important. Although the agenda is typically set by the
media, the Bush Administration exerted control over the
agendas set by the media. The Administration's
involvement with agenda setting became apparent when it
began embedding journalists during the war in Iraq.
According to Schechter (2003), the idea to embed
journalists with troops took root in 2002, when the
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Pentagon approached editors with the opportunity.
Schechter also claims that the strategists at the
Pentagon, who were in the process of planning the war,
expected journalist to broadcast certain things over their
airwaves. The images that the journalists were to portray
needed to be proud, positive, and patriotic. Journalists
were not allowed to provide sensitive information and were
limited in terms of filming dead bodies.
Media stories led the public to have misperceptions
about the war in Iraq. According to Kull (2004), a study
revealed that the media led to several misperceptions.
These misperceptions included: 1. 49% of those who were
surveyed believed that United States had found evidence
proving that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda, 2. 22% of those
surveyed believed that the United States had proof of
weapons of mass destruction, and 3. 23% of those surveyed
believe that the public opinion of the world favored
America going to war with Iraq. Kull also states, "When
the press are reluctant to challenge what government
leaders say, they can simply become a means of
transmission for administration rather than serve as a
critical filter for information." (p. 65) According to
Barstow, Stein, and Kornblut (2005), the Bush
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Administration also influenced the agenda setting of the
media by providing them with prepackaged news. Barstow
et. al. claim that the Administration used public
relations and provided the media with news reports that
were prepackaged. Barstow et. al. state that, "Some
reports were produced to support the administration's most
cherished policy objectives, like regime change in Iraq .
. ." (para. 6) These prepackaged news pieces were
broadcast in some of the United State's largest television
markets, which included New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Dallas, and Atlanta. Barstow et. al. also claim that the
prepackaged news distributed by the Administration
appeared to be like any other segment on the local news.
Conclusions
After researching the topic of my project, there were
many things that I expected to find. I expected to find
that the Bush Administration had been untruthful to the
American public about Iraq's WMDs. I also expected to
find that there would be instances where the government
would take advantage of the fear that was in the hearts of
many and use that to further their desire to go to war
with Iraq.
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Examining the rhetoric of the Bush Administration
leading to the current war in Iraq confirmed my first
expectation, that the Bush Administration had been
untruthful about Iraq's possession of WMDs was true. The
strongest piece of evidence that supports the
Administration had been untruthful to the American public
was the phony documents stolen from the Nigerien embassy
in Rome. Although it was found that the documents were
phony, the Bush Administration still used the information
contained within them as their strongest piece of evidence
supporting a war in Iraq. The only thing that mattered to
them was that the documents claimed the Iraqi ambassador
had an agreement to purchase uranium from Niger, which was
to be used to produce WMDs.
My research also revealed that when the Bush
Administration learned of aluminum tubes that were
intercepted en route to Iraq from China, they claimed that
these tubes were going to be used as centrifuges to spin
uranium and was evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons
program. However, the Administration- failed to inform the
public that there was disagreement about whether or not
the tubes were meant for the enrichment of uranium. Greg
Thielmann and a scientist from the Department of Energy
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were not convinced that the tubes were meant to be used as
centrifuges. George Tenet, former director of the CIA,
chose to believe that the aluminum tubes were evidence
that Iraq was producing WMDs.
The aluminum tube evidence prompted the CIA to write
the NIE document, which stated that the tubes were strong
evidence that Hussein was producing WMDs. When Congress
requested that they be provided with a document that was
more conclusive than the NIE, the White Paper was created,
which led the administration to be untruthful to the
American public yet again. The White Paper was an
extremely condensed version of the NIE. The document had
taken information that was presented cautiously in the NIE
and turned it in to statement of fact. Essentially the
White Paper turned information that was deemed
insufficient by Congress to declare war to presenting the
scariest case for war possible.
My second expectation was also confirmed by the
rhetorical events that are'mentioned above. The Bush
Administration used the phony documents from Niger, the
aluminum tubes, the NIE, and the White Paper to take
advantage of the fear that America was feeling after 
September 11th. The Administration understood that people
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in the United States feared the possibility of more
terrorist attacks on the country. The neoconservatives in
the Bush Administration took advantage of this fear by
leading the public to believe that Saddam Hussein had WMDs
that he planned to use against the United States.
However, what I did not expect to find was that this
quest for a regime change in Iraq had been in the minds of
so called, "neoconservatives" for many years. Before
beginning this project, it was almost unthinkable for me
that there was a group of people in this country that
would take the suffering of the thousands, perhaps
millions, to fulfill their idea of what they believe the
world should be.
Reflecting back to the literature review and what was 
discovered about propaganda during times of war and
conflict, I have learned that rhetoric and propaganda
played a major role in bringing our country from the
events of September 11, 2001 to the start of the war in
Iraq on March 19, 2003. The use of rhetoric and
propaganda made it possible for the neoconservatives to
first convince President Bush that going to war with Iraq
was the right decision, then take the fears of the
American public and use them to justify a war in Iraq.
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This is similar to the way that rhetoric and propaganda
was used during WWI, WWII, and the Cold War to gain
support for war.
The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration
accomplished their goal of going to war with Iraq buy
using rhetoric and propaganda in. different ways. The
rhetoric and propaganda of the neoconservatives in the
Administration began almost immediately after the events 
of September 11th. After the terrorist attacks, the 
neoconservatives began pushing the Iraq agenda by telling
President Bush that they believed that the country was
involved in the. attacks on the country. The alleged
intention of Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger further
pushed the agenda of the administration by providing more 
information supporting the assertion that Iraq had WMDs.
Finally, the NIE and the White paper were the final pieces
of rhetoric used by the administration to justify their
case for war. The White Paper essentially frightened the
American public into accepting that a war in Iraq was the
best course of action. The media reported all of these
"facts."
Dyer (1942) asserted that if. .propaganda is
successful, it emphasizes all of the extremes and does not
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often admit that there is a middle ground. Dyer (1942)
further asserts that a propagandist is led to take a
portion of the truth and dress it as either black or
white, which results in statements that are part truth and
part lie. It seems that the neoconservatives and other
members of the Bush Administration were using propaganda
according to Dyer's definition. The Bush Administration
had information that was part truth and part lie (the
phony documents from the Nigerien embassy). The
administration either believed that this information was
complete or they did not care if it was incomplete.
Recommendations
After completing the research for the project, there
are several recommendations for future research. The
first suggestion is that future researchers should
consider conducting primary quantitative research. Survey
research might discover how Americans were affected by
news coverage and the suggestions of WMDs by the Bush
Administration leading to the beginning of the war in
Iraq. Future researchers might also compare the rhetoric
of "left-" versus "right-" wing focused media. Doing so
78
will enable researchers to present the focus of the 
"opposition," which was not discussed in this project
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